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Advocates ofapprenticeship programs often argue as ifit is simply a matterofhistorical
accident which has hindered such investment by U.S. firms. This paper explores the
structure ofincentives undergirding the German system ofapprenticeship training. First,
we describe three characteristics of the German labor market which may lead firms to
accept part of the cost of general training, even in the face of worker turqover. In the
second part of the paper, we compare labor market outcomes for apprentices in
Germany and high school graduates in the United States. Apprentices in Germany
occupy a similar station within the German wage structure as held by high school
graduates in the U.S. labor market. Finally, we provide evidence that the problem of
fonning labor market bonds is particularly acute for minority youth-- in Germany as well
as in the U.S.. We discuss some implications for the vocational training debate in the
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2Non-Technical Summary
This paper studies the financing mechanisms that support the German apprenticeship
system. Interest in the German system has been rising lately, and it has been discussed
in a number of countries as a virtual panacea to several labor market problems. The
discussion in the U.S. is a particular case in point. But somewhat surprisingly, there is
no clear understanding - even in Germany - how the apprenticeship system works in
tenns ofits financing structure.
In our review ofthe German data, several points stand out. First, German employers-- at
least in larger, industrial firms-- face large net costs in the training of apprentices. This
seem~ to be true even after accounting for the low wages paid to apprentices. Second,
retention rates ofthese apprentices are often quite low. Apprenticeships are certainly not
the beginning of a lifelong relationship between apprentices and firms as the popular
literature often suggests. Roughly 70% of graduating apprentices leave their training
enterprise within 5 years. The departure rate is lower for large firms in the industrial
sector (50%), but still higher than widely believed.
To the extent that the skills provided during the training period appear to be generally
applicable, these facts provide a puzzle. We first describe three characteristics of
Gennan labor markets which may lead firms to be willing to accept part ofthe cost of
general training even in the face of worker turnover. The first mechanism has been
suggested by Soskice (1993) who argues that through their influence over plant-level
works councils, unions may limit poaching by other firms and thereby provide a market
within which firms are willing to make loans to workers to finance general training. As
mentioned above, there is considerable turnover among former apprentices, even within
industrial firms. However, unions may provide sufficient constraints on mobility to allow
flnns to be repaid. Indeed, apprentices who remain with the training firm earn less than
the apprentices who leave. While it is impossible to detennine if this wage differential
reveals a "wedge" between productivity and wages for those remaining with the training
finn (or simply reflects differences in the characteristics of those who get better offers
elsewhere), such evidence is at least consistent with the hypothesis that finns are repaid
by the apprentices who remain. . •
A second potential explanation focuses on the possibility that a combination ofindustry-
wide agreements specifying minimum wages for various jobs and high firing costs
bestows a high value on information regarding any particular worker's productivity.
Apprenticeship training programs may therefore serve as an extended employment test
for which employers are willing to share part ofthe cost. Although this hypothesis may
have explained part of the willingness to use apprentices in the past, much of that
incentive may have been weakened by reforms in 1986 which allowed tinns to hire
3workers for up to 18 months on fixed term contracts, not subject to the same firing
costs.
lbird, we argue that unobsetved heterogeneity in worker costs ofmobility may,playa
key role. In the presence of high mobility costs for some apprentices, workers who
remain with the training firm may end up paying for the training ofthe apprentices who
leave. This is a potentially important explanation for some firms, since 80% of all
German workers report that they have never moved to take another job. Though the
skills themselves may be generally applicable, the training may still be firm-specific to
the extent that there are mobility costs in moving to other firms. Consistent with this
hypothesis, we report evidence that, even within Germany, firms ~ more likely to
engage in training ifthey are located outside ofurban centers or within areas with fewer
finns in a similarindustry.
A fourth explanation, often mentioned in our intetviews with human resource managers
in Germany, but impossible to evaluate, is that a norm has developed within the
business community to provide such training. To comply with these social expectations,
many finns may be willing to provide such training, even though they could increase
their own profits by eliminating their apprenticeship programs and hiring apprentices
trained elsewhere. The German system may, indeed, rest upon one or more of these
explanations. Unfortunately, however, none of these conditions currently exist in the
United States. Thus, a simple transfer of the German training model is unlikely to be
successful.
In the second halfofthe paper, we sUlVey the evidence on the merits ofapprenticeship
training relative to other forms ofhuman capital investment by comparing educational
and experience wage differentials in the U.S. and Germany. Contrary to the impression
left by much of the popular discussion, German apprentices occupy roughly the same
place relative to unskilled workers and college graduates as held by high school
graduates in the U.S.. Further, the age-earnings profiles for German apprentices and
U.S. high school graduates are quite similar. These two facts are intriguing in the face of
apparent differences in human capital investments for apprentices and 'high school
graduates not going onto college. One possibility is that the differences in human capital
investments have been overstated, given the undercounting of informal on-the-job
training in the U.S.. Alternatively, there may simply be a higher return to job search for
young workers in the U.S. relative to human capital investments. We may simply be
observing two different equilibria with similar outcomes-- a high degree of search
activities by workers combined with low human capital investments by employers in the
U.S. and low search with higherhuman capital investment inGermany.
4I. Introduction
Concern about 'rising wage inequality, particularly the decline in the labor market
prospects for those without a college education, has renewed interest in policies to
promote human capital investment in the United States. Inthe searchfor policy levers, the
German apprenticeship system has served as a model for U.S. policy analysts. l However
the primary obstacle to more widespread employer-based training in the United States has
been the unwillingness ofemployers to shoulder the expense of training young workers
who are likely to leave their firms. To fill this gap, some observers have called for new
payroll tax (or "training tax") against which such training expenses might be deducted, to
provide such incentives through the tax system In considering any such policy, we should
begin with a finn understanding of how the German system itself is financed.
Unfortunately, despite its resiliency in the face of technological change and other labor
market developments over the past few decades, the structure ofincentives undergirding
the German apprenticeship system itself is not well understood-- even in Germany.2 In
this paper, we will analyze alternative explanations-ofemployers' willingness to finance
apprenticeship training in Germany and draw implications for the U.S. debate.
In our review ofthe German data, several points stand out. First, German employers-- at
least in larger, industrial firms-- face large net costs in the training of apprentices. This
seem.., to be true even after accounting for the low wages paid to apprentices: In 1972 and
1980, national commissions in Germany generated similarly large estimates ofnet costs
for these firms. Second, retention rates of these apprentices are often quite low.
Apprenticeships are certainly not the beginning of a lifelong relationship between
apprentices and firms as the popular literature often suggests. Roughly 70% ofgraduating
apprentices leave their training enterprise within 5 years. The departure rate is lower for
large films in the industrial sector (50%), but still higher than widely believed.
To the extent that the skills provided appear to be generally applicable, these facts
provide a pu~zle. We first describe three characteristics ofGerman labor markets which
may lead film<.; to be willing to accept part ofthe cost ofgeneral training even in the face
ofworker turnover.
Union Collusion and Restricted Mobility: Soskice (1993) suggests that through
their influence over plant-level works councils, unions may limit poaching by other
firms and thereby provide a market within which firms are willing'to make loans to
workers to finance general training.
L For instance, see the Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce (1990), Baily, Burtless
and Litan (1993) and Kinzer, New York Times, June 2, 1993.
See Kempf (1985) or Lehne (1991) for empirical studies of this issue. None of the studies we are
aware ofhave attempted to look in detail at the retention rates of graduating apprentices which is a
central element in our analysis.
5As mentioned above, there is considerable turnover among fonner apprentices, even
within industrial finns. However, unions may provide sufficient constraints on mobility to
allow finns to be repaid. Indeed, apprentices who remain "-with the training finn earn less
than the apprentices who leave. While it is impossible to determine if this wage
differential reveals a "wedge" between productivity and wages for those remaining with
the training finn (or simply reflects differences in the characteristics of those who get
better offers elsewhere), such evidence is at least consistent with the hypothesis that finns
are repaid by the apprentices who remain.
-Inflexible Wages, High Firing Costs and Option Value: The combination of
industry-wide agreements specifying minimum wages for various jobs and high
firing costs bestows a high value on information regarding any particular worker's
productivity. Apprenticeship training programs may therefore serve as an extended
employment test for which employers are willing to share part ofthe cost.
Although this hypothesis may have explained part ofthe willingness to use apprentices in
the past, much of that incentive may have been weakened by refonns in 1986 which
allowed firms to hire workers for up to 18 months on fixed tenn contracts, not subject to
the same firing costs.
Unobserved Heterogeneity in Worker Costs of Mobility: In the presence of high
mobility costs for some apprentices, a short-tenn equilibrium may be reached
where the workers who remain with the training finn pay for the training of the
apprentices who leave. This is a potentially important explanation for some finns,
since 80% of all Gennan workers report that they have never moved to take
anotherjob. Though the skills themselves may be generally applicable, the training
may still be finn-specific to the extent that there are mobility costs in moving to
otherfirms.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we report evidence that, even within Gennany, finns are
more likely to engage in training if they are located outside of urban centers or within
areas with fewer firms in a similar industry.
A fourth explanation, often mentioned in ourinterviews with human resource managers in
Gennany, but impossible to evaluate, is that a nonn has developed within the business
community to provide such training. To comply with these social expectations, many
flnns may be willing to provide such training, even though they could increase their own
profits by eliminating their apprenticeship programs and hiring apprentices trained
elsewhere. The Gennan system may, indeed, rest upon one ormore ofthese explanations.
Unfortunately, however, none ofthese conditions currently exist in the United States.
In the second half of the paper, we survey the evidence on the merits of apprenticeship
training relative to other fonTIS ofhuman capital investment by comparing educational and
experience wage differentials in the U.S. and Gennany. Contrary to the impression left by
much of the popular discussion, Gennan apprentices occupy roughly the same place
6relative to unskilled workers and college graduates as held by high school graduates in
the U.S.. Further, the age-earnings profiles for German apprentices and U.S. high school
graduates are quite similar. These two facts are intriguing in the face of apparent
differences in human capital investments for apprentices and high school graduates not
going on to college. One possibility is that the differences in human capital investments
have been overstated, given the undercounting ofinforrnaIon-the-job training in the U.S..
Alternatively, there may simply be a higher return to job search for young workers in the
U.S. relative to finn-specific human capital investments. We may simply be observing
two different equilibria with similar outcomes-- active search with low finn-specific
investments in the U.S. and low search with more specific investment in Germany.
Below, we- provide some institutional detail on the German system in section II. In
section ill, we review the evidence regarding the employer's costs of providing
apprenticeship training. In section N, we evaluate each ofthe three potential reasons for
finu<;;' financing ofinvestment in general skills. Insection V, we compare the earnings and
employment ofU.S. high school graduates and GeIman apprentices. In the final section,







The German educational system is much more explicitly differentiated than the U.S.
system. Though we will not provide a detailed explanation here, there are basically five
paths that students follow, as summarized in Table 1:
Educational Attainment in Germany
Terminal middle school degree
Middle school degree plus one-year




preparatory school degree orMaster
certificate
Three-year technical university programs College/University
or Four-year (or longer) university training Graduate
Table 1 displays the educational background of three age cohorts of male German
workers. The portion of the workforce without any post-secondary training has been
declining steadily in Germany. While 17% of those turning 18 between 1955 and 1962
did not have any post-secondary training, this share had fallen below 10% in the
Seventies. In contrast to the United States, however, very few ofthese students attended
university: Academic or technical university graduates represented only 12% of 27-34
year-old workers in 1986. (University enrollment has grown rapidly during the Eighties.)
However, the largest group-- about two-thirds ofthe workforce-- completed a 2-3.5 year
apprenticeship in·the dual system. It is this ability of the German system to provide
training to the non-college-bound which has attracted the attention of U.S. policy-
makers.4
3 We only provide a brief summary of important institutional aspects. For more detailed accounts see
Franz and Soskice (1994), Streeck et al. (1987), and Winkelmann (1994).
4 There has been some disagreement in the literature regarding the effect ofcompulsory schooling laws
on the proportion ofyouth "choosing" to complete apprenticeships. Taken literally, state laws seem to
require youth to attend school through age 18. Since general schooling is usually completed at age
16, the "willingness" of youth to participate in apprenticeships has been attributed to these
compulsory schooling requirements. In practice, though, the states allow youth to fulfill the further
schooling requirement by attending one year of vocational college, usually between age 16 and 17.
For more on this, see Steedman (1993).
8Training which occurs at a finn is only one part of the expense involved in the Gennan
dual system of apprenticeship training. The acUective, "dual," is due to the fact that
apprentices typically attend publicly-funded--'Yocational schools 1-2 days a week in
addition to working at the firms. Further, there are a host of coordinating activities
performed by the federal Bundesinstitut fiir Berufsbildung (BiBB) and industry
organizations or "chambers", the latter funded by membership taxes which all firms in an
industry are legally required to pay. For instance, training firms have to demonstrate that
their trainers ~lfill certain minimum requirements and that the entetprise can provide the
training for the respective occupations. Therefore, the vocational schools themselves and
much of the coordinating functions are shared collectively through various taxes.
However, in this paper, we will explore the financing of the portion of the dual system
training occurring on employers' premises. 5
Ill. Net Costs of Training to Firms: Do Appreptices Pay the Bill?
We first test whether the Gennan system reflects the textbook example in which workers
pay for their training by accepting wages below their productivity. 6 As Becker (1964)
argues in his classic work, the party writing the trainer's check need not be paying for the
training. Trainees could compensate their employers by accepting wages less than the
value of the products they produce. Indeed, since an apprentice's wage is typically
between one-half and one-third of that of a skilled worker, some have conjectured that
net costs to finTIS ofproviding apprenticeship training may indeed be zero. In accordance
with Soskice (1994) and Steedman (1993), however, we conclude that this hypothesis is
only partially correct. Among smaller craft firms, the costs of apprenticeship training to
employers have probably been overstated and may be close to zero, ~ut many of the
large, industrial finn") continue to make substantial investments in apprenticeships which
require explanation.
Since 1970, there have been three major attempts to answer this question in Gennany.
7All ofthese studies have attempted to account for the various types ofcosts and benefits
involved for fmns.s Table 2 reports the estimated costs of such training by sector and
'i A few small industries, such as construction, have resorted to taxing members"of industrial chambers
to pay for the centralized training centers where apprentices are trained. This is the exception,
however. See Timmermann (1993).
(, For instance. see Heckman (1993).
7 SeeSachverstdndigenkommission (1974), Nollet. a1. (1983) and Bardeleben (1994).
x The simplest component of costs to measure are materiaL<; costs and apprentices' wages. However,
the remaining portion is much more difficult to capture. For instance, one must account for the wage
costs oftraining personnel. This is a straightforward measurement at larger firms which often employ
full-time training personnel. At smaller craft fIrm<;. however, it is a much more difficult task. since the
apprentice may often be looking over the shoulder of the master craftsman engaged in productive
9category of cost for both 1970 and 1980.9 Rssuits from the third study are not complete
as ofnow, but cost data by finn size and for the two major tmining sectors are available.
In all ofthese studies, the net cost oftraining apprentices is estimated to be positive in all
sectors, but highest in larger, industrial finns: In 1980, the estimated net cost to the timl
for a year of apprenticeship training was roughly $5991 and $9381 in the craft and
industrial/trade sectors respectively (1990 U.S. dollars). Further, these net costs represent
a higher proportion of gross costs (before considering apprentices' productivity) in
industry. It is also evident from Table 2 that training costs have risen substantially over
the last 20 years.
However. as Soskice (1994) conjectures, such estimates probably overstate training costs
in craft tinns. In smaller craft finns, master cmftsmen h£lve considerable tlexibility in the
scheduling ofthe training sessions. It would certainly be reasonable to expect that much
of the training occurs during slack periods of the day when the opportunity costs of the
trainers' time is lowest. For instance, a master plumber might be expected to instmct
hisiher apprentices on days when there are few calls to be made, on the way to a job or at
the end of the day. Therefore, the average cost of a master craftsman's time probably
overstates the actual costs of the periods of training. In contrast, industrial fimls usually
employ full-time training personnel, who often train apprentices in classroom settings
away from the production line. The reported costs for these tirms are more likely to
approximate the tme costs of the resources required for training. lo This argument was
pursued in a 1991 BffiB study.II Excluding the wage costs for trainers who are not full-
time, training costs in the crafts sector are on the order of $240 and thus negligible. In
trade and industry, net costs to the firm for a year of apprenticeship training were
approximately $5485 (1990 U.S. Dollars).
work. Both studies simply asked supervisors to estimate how much time they spent instructing
apprentices, which; when multiplied by the wage of such instructors, provided an estimate of the
training personnel costs. Finally, investigators attempted to measure the value of apprentice
production during the course of their training. Employers were asked to report the amount of time
apprentices spent in production, the relative productivity ofan apprentice to a skilled worker and the
wage ofskilled workers at the firm The value ofapprentice production was estimated as the product
ofthese three.
'j Wage and cost figures reported in this paper have been converted to 1990 U.S. 'dollars by first
accounting for inflation with the German consumer price index through 1990 and then applying the
average exchange rate ofOM 1.62 per U.S. $.
III Data from the Eighties appear to be consl<;tent with the assumption that net training costs are close to
zero in the crafts sector. As Franz and Soskice (1994, Table 5) show, the crafts sector's demand for
apprentices was far more elastic than that of industry and trade in response to larger youth cohorts in
the early Eighties.
II The difference between fulJ and prime cost estimates is mostly due to the treatment of part-time
trainers. In the full cost measurement, part-time trainers are included while they are excluded in the
prime cost estimates.
10lllough cmalysts in the U.S. have recently discovered the issue, the size ofthe net cost of
apprenticeship training has been a matter ofconsiderable debate in Germany for decades.
For example, in the face ofrising cohort sizes during the Seventies, the issues offinancing
and employer incentives were hotly debated. Labor representatives have sought to
understate the costs in an attemprto pressure employers to provide more training slots for
potential members. On the other side of the debate, employers have tried to overstate
costs to promote a public image of social consciousness, to bargain for greater public
subsidies for vocational schools and to obtain more flexibility in the type oftraining they
provide to apprentices. It is of some importance, therefore, that the three studies
commissioned by the government have concluded that the net costs of training are
substantial, with the likely exception ofthe crafts sector.
IV. Evaluating Reasons Why German Firms Might Invest in General Human
Capital
In the simplest Becker formulation, we would expect finns to share the costs of specific
capitaL but leave general investments to be paid by workers.12 However, it is puzzling
that much of the training in Germany appears to be generally applicable. Industrial
chambers. which license firms seeking to hire apprentices, regulate the type of training
which occurs in two ways. First, theY,develop the tests which apprentices must pass to
receive their skilled worker certificate. These tests focus upon ~kills generally applicable
in the industry. FimL"l with consistently low pass rates have their training licenses
revoked. Second. the chambers not only regulate the output of apprenticeship training
programs. but often regulate the content as well. For instance, they may list the skills
which the training program must cover as well as, in some cases, the anlount oftime they
are to receive in the curriculum.
We first describe and evaluate three different characteristics ofthe German labor market
institutions which may lead finns to provide general human capital skills which are not
contemporaneously tinanced by worker productivity:
• Union Collusion, Works Councils and Restricted Mobility
• Unobserved Heterogeneity in Worker's Costs ofMobility
• Firing Costs. Unceltainty and Option Value
12 For a discussion of the use of deferred benetits packages in employment relationships. see Lazear
(10Xl ).
11A. Union Collusion, Works Councils and Restricted Mobility
Soskice (1993) suggests that union influence over plant-level works councils plays a
critical role in allowing finns to provide temporary financing to apprentices. As a result of
German labor law, wage floors are set by region and industry through negotiations
between industrial unions and employers' associations. However, individual employers
and works councils negotiate supplements to these minima at the tinn level. The works
councils in each ofthe plants are elected by employees and typically have strong informal
ties to local unions. Although employers maintain control of hiring decisions, Soskice
argues that works councils effectively limit the "poaching" of skilled workers trdined
elsewhere through their intluence over these wage agreements, setting pay scales for
skilled workers trained internally and by other finns. According to Soskice. unions help to
solve the borrowing constraint problem by limiting non-training finns' ability to attract
workers and, thereby, allowing employers to make "loans" to apprentices for general
human capital investments.
However, turnover rates are much higher than popularly believed, even within the
industrial sector. Figure I portmys the propol1ion of apprentices leaving the timl where
they were trdined by year of apprenticeship completion and timing of departure. For
instance, roughly 30% of all apprentices leave the firm where they were trained
immediately upon completion oftheir training. Within 5 years ofthe end oftraining, 70%
ofthe typical firms' apprentices have left. As evident in Figure I, departure rates vary by
sector. being highest within the crafts sector and lowest in industry. This is consistent
with the notion that craft apprenticeships may have zero net costs for employers.
However, even in industrial firms with more than 1000 employees, 50% of those
completing apprenticeships leave the firm where they were trdined within 5 years.
Two other facts are evident in Figure 1. Because retrospective data are available for
workers of various ages, it is possible to study the trend in exit rates over time with a
cross-section. First, despite understandably high departure rates in the years immediately
following WWII, the leaving rates have been as high through the post-war period. These
exit rates are not the result of high German unemployment rates recently. Rather, high
tumover has been a long-term feature ofthe German system. Second, at least in industlY,
exit rates seem to have begun falling during the Seventies.
Despite the high exit rates, apprentices may linger "long enough" to reimburse fimls for
subsidizing their training. This is impossible to answer directly, given that we do not
actually observe any given workers' productivity. However, since we have data on the
probability ofretention and on the actual eamings offormer apprentices, we can calculate
the amount by which productivity would have to exceed wages to compensate films for
the cost ofapprenticeship training.13 Basend on our estimates ofage-eamings profiles and
1'1 Let C denote the net cost of apprenticeship training. If ret) is the expected rate of retention for an
apprentice of experience t and Wet) is the respective wage. Suppose that workers' productivity was
12fQr VVeHvvi r(sch~ft Kiat
retention rates using the 1985 data, we computed the necessary productivity differential
for film" in industry and trade. Given the estimated cost to finns oftraining an apprentice
in industry and trade, workers would have to be 24.5% more productive than their wages
to compensate their employers.J4 As is well-known, indirect labor costs are fairly high in
Germany. and gross wage payments will underestimate true labor costs. IS For instance, if
indirect labor expenditures were 50% of gross wages, the required wedge between
productivity and labor costs would have to be only 16.4%.
Moreover, if those remaining with the training firm are being paid something less than
their productivity, we would observe a wedge between the earnings of those who
remained and of those who left the firm where they were trained. We estimated wage
differentials for apprentices departing the training firm at different points in their careers.
These are reported in Table 3 separately for apprentices trained in the industrial and crafts
sector.~As reported in column (l), those who left immediately at the end oftheir training
eamed R.3 and 5.0% higher wages than the apprentices with similar years ofexperience
who remained with the training firm. However, a-large part of this seems to be due to
attendance of further schooling. As reported in column (2), these differentials are
eliminated for former craft apprentices once one controls for years of schooling
completed. However; industrial apprentices leaving during the first year still earned 6.6%
more than those who remained. This was true even after controlling for employing firm
size and industry effects in column (3).
Unf0l1unately. we cannot identify in our data whether the skilled workers are joining
"free-riding" fim1s which do no training. However, it seems that a number of finns,
'( I+Yl*W(t). In other words, if Yis positive, then firms are recovering some of their investment by
paying workers less than their productivity. Firms would expect to recoup their investments if the
following condition were met:
C = I;=J'fI'(f)W(f)(1+dr
l
For our calculations. we assumed a discount rate (d) of 6% and that apprentices remain with the
company for a maximum of T=40 years. Estimates of the earnings profiles were obtained using a
quartic in experience for stayers, controlling for firm size and field of apprenticeship training.
Retention rates. ret). were estimated from survey responses using a non,-parametric life-table
estimator. We assumed a duration of3 years for apprenticeship training. '
14 The cost tigures entering the computation are averages of the 1991 and 1980/81 estimates. $10.650
($llJlJ() U.S) per apprentice per year.
15 Employers are legally bound to contribute 50% of their employees' social security. health and
unemployment insurance payments. In many industries and in particular in large firm". additional
benetits are negotiated between employers and unions. According to computations by the Federal
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 1992. p. (02). indirect labor costs for industrial finns with
more than 50 employees amounted to 71.8% ofdirect costs in 1981 and 82. ()<'!e, in 1988. respectively.
In IlJ85. the average blue collar worker earned an income of OM 3000. but employers faced labor
costs ofroughly OM 5300 per worker.particularly medium-sized finns, provide little or no apprenticeship tmining. 16 Data from
the 1987 Census ofEstablishments show that about 84% ofall establishments with more
than 500 employees provide apprenticeship training. For establishments with 100 to 500
employees, the respective share is about 70%, and for firms with 50 to 100 employees it
is only 60%.17 As we show in the next section, there is also considemble variation in the
extent oftmining among training finns. Firms appear to adjust their training decisions to
local labor market conditions in a way that is consistent with the poaching hypothesis.
B. Some Advantages of Residential Inertia: German Workers' Unwillingness to
Move
In 1986, 80% of the German workforce reported that they had never moved to take
another job. This fact may indeed have some significance for the provision oftraining. In
a simple model sketched below, finns may be willing to invest when there are initially
unobserved differences in worker tastes for mobility. As long as there are "enough"
workers with high costs of mobility willing to work fQr the local employer, one might
observe fInns continuing to provide training in the presence of considerable turnover and
poaching by other employers. In expectation, there must simply be enough "trapped"
employees from whom the employer can extmct payment. This is another form of skill
specificity: though the skills themselves seem to be genemlly applicable, there may be
few employment opportunities within a geographically acceptable mnge.
Empirical Evidence
We test the relationship between potential mobility and training incentives using data on
regional variation in finns' tmining decisions in Germany.I8 Using data on training
decisions for a sample of 1461 finns in 1992, we find that the number of similar tilms in
the surrounding labor market has a negative effect on firms' training decisions. In the top
panel of Table 4, we report probit coefficients from a specification with apprenticeship
training (0 or 1) as the dependent variable; the bottom panel contains the results of tobit
specifications with apprentices per employee as the dependent variable. (Roughly one-
quarter (25%) ofthe finns in the panel do no training.) As reported in the first column of
Table 4, those located in counties categorized as urban or suburban were signiticantly
less likely to train apprentices and, among those who trained, trained fewer apprentices
peremployee.19 The results in column (2) add the size ofthe county workforce. Not only
16 Soskice (1993) reports data from a survey ofemployers regarding apprenticeship training program~.
However, response rates were quite low in that survey. Since the survey was explicitly focused upon
training issues, one might have expected training firms to be more likely to respond.
17 These data are tabulated in greater detail in Henniges (1994, Table 27a).
18 The data originate with a survey commissioned by the Ministry of Research and Technology. For
details on sampling frame and questionnaire design see Harhoffand Licht (1994).
Ie) There are 328 West German counties, of which 92 were categorized as "urban" and 122 as "urban
fringe".
14are those in cities less likely to train, but size ofcity has a negative effect onthe presence
and extent of apprenticeship training. B~sed on regional planning data20, we also
calculated the size ofthe workforce within 45 minutes by car or train ofeach county. As
reported in column (3), firms in counties near other large counties are also less likely to
train and train fewer apprentices. Each of these specifications also includes 6 dummies
for fmn size, 10 states and 30 dummies for two-digit industries. In the final column, we
include a measure ofthe number ofother firms in the same industry in the same county,
which has a marginally significant negative effect onthe extent ofapprenticeship training.
Therefore, even in Germany, firms are much more willing to train when there are fewer
fum~ around to poach theirtrainees.
C. Firing Costs, Uncertainty and Option Value
The combination of high firing costs and binding wage minima in the German labor
market confers value upon any information employers can gather regarding a particular
employee's productivity before hiring them. Since_an employer can decide not to hire an
apprentice, but faces considerable costs when firing a regular employee, the finn may be
willing to subsidize apprenticeship training. Therefore, regardless of any human capital
which may be developed along the way, such apprenticeship programs may serve as an
expensive employment test for which employers (and apprentices) may be willing to pay.
However, unlike a simple employment test, observing an apprentice provides more
information than just their current productivity. It also allows an employer to observe a
worker's capacity for learning new skills. Since wage bargaining in Germany often
regulates not only the level ofearnings, but the returns to tenure as well, this information
on an employee's human capital production function would have value.
If employers could completely observe a worker's potential at initial selection, however,
there would be little option value offered by apprenticeships, since the less productive
workers could be identified without the apprenticeship programs. Some information
appears to be generated in the process of training, though, since 10% of former
apprentices (or roughly In of those who leave the training finn) in 1985 reported that
they had left the training firm because they were not offered a contract by their employer
at the end ofthe training.
However, German employers have alternatives to apprenticeship training programs to
evaluate the skills of workers. Until 1985, employers could hire workers on fixed term
contracts of 6 months. During this period, such employees are not covered by the laws
requiring prior notification or the negotiation of severance packages. In 1986, this limit
was raised to 18 months. The use of such contracts has increased somewhat in recent
20 The data were supplied by the Bundeso/lstaltfur Regionalku/lde und Roump!ammg (BtLR 1992).
15years.21 Therefore, w~e we find the employment test explanation intriguing, much ofthat
incentive may have been weakened bythe legal refonns ofthe Eighties.
As Abraham and Houseman (1993) suggest, high firing costs make apprenticeship
progra.tm valuable for a second reason. A German finn may more flexibly adjust
apprentice employment than the regular workforce. Apprentices, then, become a buffer
for adjusting employment levels with short-term demand fluctuations. Therefore, even if
there were no information gathered during the course of the .training, having a reserve
pool ofapprentices may be valuable, again due to the high firing costs in Germany.
Finns' ability to layoffgroups ofworkers has been regulated underGerman law, although
such regulations were loosened in 1986. From 1972 to 1986, employers laying off more
than 10% of their workforce or more than 30 workers were required to negotiate a
severance package for the employees.22 Finns unable to reach such agreements were
required to submit to arbitration. As part of the "Employment Promotion Act of 1985",
the limits on group-layoffs were loosened somewhat, to-apply only to layoffs involving
20% ofthe workforce or 60 workers. Hemmer (1988, p. 60) estimates from a sample of
145 such compensation plans that the median settlement was equal to 5.8 months of
earnings in the chemical industry and 3.8 and 1.6 months of earnings in the metal-
working and textiles industries. Employers are also required to provide minimum amounts
ofadvance notice depending upon the tenure ofthe employee.
The extent of regulation is less clear for dismissals not covered by any Sozialplan
(compensation plan). The works council must be consulted before any dismissal of a
regular employee. Although the employer need not receive the approval of the works
council to fire an employee, the works council's finding may be used by the former
employee in any subsequent legal challenge. However, the severance payments typically
agreed upon in such court proceedings orin settlements betweenfinns and employees are
small in comparison to the net training costs. The most comprehensive study, conducted
from 1,978 to 1980, is based on an analysis of 800 court proceedings. The median
severance payment was found to be around $1750 (1990).23 An upperbound on the value
of the information generated by an apprenticeships would be the probability that a finn
will find an unsuitable employee (1n of workers reported that they were not offered a
contract by the training finns), multiplied by the expected severance payment. Thus, the
option value derived from apprenticeships is fairly low in the case of individual
dismissals. \
21 Biichteman (1990) discusses the empirical evidence and concludes that fixed-term contracts were
used primarily for screening purposes prior and after the 1985 refonn He concludes that a lack of
screening opportunities has not been a constraint in German employers' hiring decisions.
22 See Abraham and Houseman (1993) for a more detailed description.
23 The study was conducted by the Max-Planck Institute for International Law in Hamburg. The results
ofthe study are described in some detail in Bundesarbeitsblatt 5/1981, pp. 18-22.
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Any policy to develop school-to-work programs in the U.S. must be based upon a clear
understanding of employer incentives. We outlined three possible explanations of
German employers' willingness to provide such training in the face of worker turnover.
The German human resource managers we interviewed often offered a fourth explanation
which is difficult to evaluate: history may have led to the development ofa norm among
German employers to provide such training. Evenifindividual firms could increase their
profits by simply hiring the apprentices trained elsewhere, it may be too "shameful" to do
so.
Unfortunately, it is clear that none of these conditions exist in the U.S.. With unions
representing only 15% ofthe workforce and enjoying much weaker legal standing, they
could hardly be counted upon to limit employer poaching. Further, as the experience of
the Eighties has demonstrated, wages are relatively flexible in the U.S.. This fact, along
with low firing costs, suggests that U.S. employers may be less willing to invest in
apprentices for the sole purpose offinding the most productive workers. There may also
be many too few workers with high mobility costs to sustain an equilibrium such as the
one sketched above. Finally, to the extent that the German system is bolstered by the
social expectation that employers provide such training, no such norm exists in the U.S..
As a result, we conclude that any such program will depend upon other inducements,
such as a "training tax" or similar public subsidy to survive. However, before endol"&ing
such a measure, we attempt to evaluate the payoffs to such training by comparing the
employment and earnings ofU.S. high school graduates and Germanapprentices below.
V. Do German Apprentices FareBetterthan U.S. High School Graduates?
The German apprenticeship has been held up as a model for improving the life prospects
of the non-college-bound. While there have been a number ofquestions about how one
could implement such a system in the U.S., the presumed merits of apprenticeship
programs have gone unquestioned in the' current debate. We compare differences in the
payoff to education and training in the U.S. and Germany and take a closer look at
differences in youth- unemployment in the two countries.
Educational Earnings Differentials in the U.S. and the FRG
The top panel reports the proportion of the U.S. and German male, full-time, non-self-
employed workforce by level of education. A majority of German workers (63%) have
completed an apprenticeship. Because the two groups complete a. similar number of
years ofeducation and training before entering the labor market, we compare the earnings
ofGerman apprentices to those ofhigh school graduates in the U.S.. (The typical route
to completing an apprenticeship is to complete 9-10 years of schooling and, later, to
spend an additional 2-3.5 years in an apprenticeship program.) One fifth ofU.S. workers
report completing some college and 30% completed 4 or more years of college, as
17compared with 8% and 11 % respectively, of German workers. (Master certificate
recipients and abitur holders without a college degree are included in the "some college"
category in the German data. Graduates ofboth universities and technical universities are
counted as college graduates in Germany.)
As reported in the second panel ofTable 5, the log weekly earnings differential per year
offormal education or training is similar in the U.S. and Germany: 8.1 versus 7.3%. The
third panel ofTable 5 reports the results ofa second specification, estimating log weekly
earnings ,differentials for each of the other educational groups relative to high school
graduates in the U.S. and apprentices in Germany, while continuing to allow for a
quadratic in experience. Again, the results are remarkably similar in the U.S. ~and
Germany: apprentices earn roughly 19% more than those completing 10 orfewer years of
schooling; high school graduates earn 23% more than a similar group in the U.S..
Similarly, apprentices earn 47% less than German college graduates, a figure quite similar
to the college-high school differential in the U.S. (42%).
Therefore, relative to unskilled workers and college graduates, German apprentices
occupy essentially the same position in the German wage structure as held by high school
graduates in the U.S.. Further, this seems to be true on average as well as over the life-
cycle. Figure 2 reports age-earnings profiles for each ofthe three groups in the U.S. and
Germany in 1979. The slope of these proftles is a potential indicator of additions to a
group's stock ofhuman capital. Average earnings were fit to a cubic in age separdtely for
each group. To avoid the vagaries ofcurrency comparisons, earnings within each country
are reported relative to those of a 30-year-old German apprentice or U.S. high school
graduate in that year. Both relative earnings and the slope ofthe profiles are similar in the
two countries. Between ages 21 and 30, the earnings growth of U.S. high school
graduates and German apprentices are estimated to be virtually identical. Between age 30
and 40, the slope ofthe profile is actually steeper for U.S. high school graduates. Similar
profiles are reported in Figure 3 for 1985. Among the apprentices/high school graduates
and middle school graduates/high school drop-outs, the age earnings profiles became
steeper. Further, there was a dramatic increase in the relative earnings of young U.S.
college graduates. How~ver, the age-earnings profile of U.S. high school gTl!duates
continued to be quite similar to that ofGerman apprentices.
Differences in Youth Unemployment in the U.S. and Germany
In the previous section, we focused upon earnings differentials among those who were
employed full-time. Table 6 provides a closer look at differences in youth unemployment
in the U.S. and Germany, using data from the U.S. Current Population Survey in 1989
and the German Mikrocensus in 1991.24 (The most recent data available for Germany
24 We have attempted to use a similar definition of unemployment in the two countries, using similar
~ questions on specific job search methods to qualify for unemployed status. Apprentices were counted
as having been in school and employed.
18were from 1991. We chose 1989 for the U.S. in order to find a similar point in the
business cycle.)
As has often been reported in the U.S. debate over apprenticeship training, the youth
unemployment rate is higher in the U.S. than in Germany. Among 16-19 year-old males,
the U. S. and German unemployment rates were 15.7 and 4.5 percentage points
respectively. However, this"oft-cited comparison overstates the difference in school and
labor force attachment between the two countries, simply because it is more common to
mix part-time schooling with labor force participation in the U.S. For instance, 59% of
unemployed 16-19 year-aIds and 15% cifunemployed 20-24 year-aIds in the U.S. were
also enrolled in school. German university students are required to be enrolled "full-time"
to receive free tuition. Accordingly, only 8% of unemployed German 20-24 year-aIds
were enrolled in school. Limiting our attention to the proportion ofthe population that is
both out-of-school and unemployed, the magnitude of the problem in the U.S. appears
smaller and differences between the U.S. and Germany are less glaring. Among 20-24
year olds, the proportion of the population that was not-in-school and unemployed was
5.7% in the U.S.. The similar rate in Germany was 3.1 percent. (Among 16-19 year aIds,
the rates were 3.5% in the U.S. and 1.1% inGermany.) ,
Further, such weak labor force attachment is much more common among racial
minorities-- in Germany as well as the U.S.. As reported inTable 6, 9% of20-24 year-old
African American and Hispanic males were out-of-school and unsuccessfully looking for
work. The problem was no less acute in Germany, where 8.1 % of 20-24 year-aIds of
foreign descent (primarily Turks) were in a similar predicament. Therefore, in both
countries, minority youth face a more difficult challenge in establishing solid labor force
attachments. In the U.S., "hiring audits," in which matched pairs ofminority and white
youth apply for the same jobs, have suggested discrimination in hiring for entry-level
jobs. (Turner, Fix and SJruyk (1991) and Fix and Struyk'(1993)) Presumably, any such
discrimination would affect decisions regarding the provision of apprenticeship training.
Apparently, the German system is no more successful in providing those links than U.S.
institutions.
Interpretation
Despite the apparent differences in human capital investment in the U.S. and Germany,
we do not observe differences in wage growth or employment over the life-cycle of
Gennan apprentices and U.S. high school graduates. There are at least two possible
explanations for this fact. First, because of undercounting ofinformal on-the-job training
by U.S. high school graduates, we may be overstating the difference in human capital
investment in the two countries. But second, as Jovanovic(1979) argues, there may be a
trade-off between fum-specific investments and job search. With industry-wide wage
agreements, there may simply be a lower payoff to job search in Germany. Indeed, as
retlected in the R2 in Table 5, there is less residual wage variation in Gennany than the
U.S. To the extent that this variation reflects realizable differences in job match quality
rather than worker heterogeneity, there may be a higher payoff to search in the U.S.
19Figure 4 reports the meantenure in one's current jobfor male high school graduates in the
U.S. and apprentices in Germany.25 Although turnover rates are higher than believed in
Germany, they are apparently lower than in the United States. Topel and Ward (1992)
estimate that at least one-third ofthe wage growth achieved by U.S. workers between the
ages of 18 and 34 occurs at job transitions, rather than within jobs. Therefore, American
workers may be investing heavily injob search at young ages because it pays to do so. In
contrast, due to industry-wide'wage agreements, which limit match-specific payments,
German workers may invest more heavily in finn-specific skills. We may simply be
observing two different equilibria-- high specific investment with little job search in
Germany and low investment, high job search in the U.S.-- which yield similar wage
profiles.
IV. Discussion
Inthis paper, we first described three possible reasons for German employers' willingness
to invest in training. Unfortunately, none of these conditions currently exist in the U.S..
Therefore, it may not be an historical accident or lack ofimagination which has led U.S.
firms and workers to invest less in some fonn of apprenticeship training. Rather, the
reason may lie in the many otherdifferences betweenthe two labor markets.
One method for "creating" such.,incentives for employers would be to establish a payroll
tax against which training expenses can be deducted.26 Such a tax could be tailored to
subsidize training of particular groups of workers, but at the price of encouraging a
numberofpotentially offsetting inefficiencies.27
Before advocating such a drastic step, the institutional advantages ofthe German system
should be examined more closely. The tabulations reported above would suggest that
German apprentices have relative earnings and earnings growth similar to U.S. high
school graduates. Further, the differences in laborforce attachment are much less striking
25 The data for the U.S. were drawn from the January 1987 Current Population Survey.
26 In fact, a similar measure (Berufsbildungsabgabe) was enacted in Germany in 1976\in the face of
mushrooming cohorts of 16-19 year-olds. The measure permitted the German government to impose
a training tax whenever the supply of apprenticeship positions did not exceed demand by at least
12.5%. However, although the supply/demand criterion was satisfied during some years in the 80s,
the government never imposed the Berufsbildungsabgabe due to employer opposition. Moreover, in
1980 the Bundesveifassungsgericht (Supreme Court) declared the law void for a number of formal
legal considerations. Faced with a notable reduction in the supply ofapprenticeship positions, German
observers ofthe vocational training system have just started a new discussion on appropriate financing
mechanisms, including a training levy (see the contributions in Liesering et al. 1994).
27 For a discussion ofthe potentialinefficiencies introduced by a payroll tax, see Heckman, Roselius and
Smith (1993).
20when one recognizes that, many unemployed youth in the U.S. are in school. Minority
youth in the U.S. have the most difficulty making attachments to the labormarket and it is
not at all clear that an apprenticeship system dependent upon the hiring decisions of
employers wOlJ.ld be well targeted toward this group. Minority youth in Germany have
similar rates ofdetachment as observed in the U.S..
There may be alternative policies to generate human capital investment which are more
consistent with U.S. labor market institutions and more easily targeted. The underlying
market failure is the inability of youth to borrow against future earnings. Youth
themselves will always have an incentive to make worthwhile investments, given that
their foregone earnings represent a large share ofthe costs ofattendance. Many ofthese
marginal youth presumably enter at community colleges, where Kane and Rouse (1995)
have estimated payoffs per year ofeducation similar to those observed for 4-year college
students. Public tuition levels increased more than 50% and federal grants to
disadvantaged students l)ave fallen in real value. If we are concerned about the
availability of training for disadvantaged youth, loosening these bottlenecks, rather than
subsidizing apprenticeship programs, may indeed have a greaterpay-offin the long-run.
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24Table 1
Educational Background
German Male Workers by Cohort
rill/l'll/iOlla! Back"rulllld by ARe Cohan
Year Turned 18:
fill/t'of/olla! AlIaillllJCll1. I 1955-1962 I 1963-1970 I 1971-1978
II) Ye;u's of Schooling or less 17.0% 12.8% 9.4%
11-1:\ Ye,u's of Schooling 1.0% 1.3% 2.2%
Apprenticeship Training:
Apprenticeship Only 61.9% 63.0% 66.3%
Apprenticeship + Master Certificate 8.3% 7.4% 5.1%
Technical University (3-ycar program) 4.6% 3.8% 5.4%
University (4-year progr,un) 5.8% 9.6% 8.5%
Otl1l~" PllS(SeCOnoarv 1-.4% 2.1% 3.3%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N: 2952 3144 3387
Nule: Derived fmJl1 authors' tabulations of the Qualifikatioll undBerufsverlaufSurvey 1985/86. The data do not
indude non-Genn:m nationals working in Gennany.Table 2
Costs of Apprenticeship Training by Training Sector
1971/72 and 1980 Estimates
1'J71!72 ESlimates: (Per apprentice and vear.)
Training Sector I Gross Costs I Apprentice's
Productivity
I
Net Costs Net Costs ,L~
'i( llfGr\lss
Costs
All Sectors* S7.774 S3.51 R S4.255 55'i(
Industry and Trade* 9.971 3.04() 6.123 ()7
>=1UOO employees !O.600 2.640 7.95lJ 75
< WOO employees 9.080 3.072 6.()06 (,6
Crafts 6.233 3.163 3.071 4lJ
Consultancy Professions 7.8h9 5.979 l.XlJO 24
Puhlic Service n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Agriculture 6J60 5.lJO(i 453 7
Health Sector 6.299 6.197 1U2
Source: SachversUindigenkOlTIlTIlssion (1974). *Weighted averages computed hy the authors.
Note: All cost figures in 1990$. The 1971n2 figures were deOated <lIldthen converted to USS at a rale llf SI.62(DM.












All Sectors S12.845 S5,()91 S7.75"- hO'h
Industry and Trade* 14.654 5.272 lJ.3RI M
>=1000 employees n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
< J(lOO employees n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Crafts 10.939 4.947 5.9lJI 55
Consultancy Professions 13.199 4.700 8.499 M
Puhlic Service 17.855 814 15.1)41 84
Agriculture 10,420 7.673 2.746 26
Health Sector n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Noll et al. (1983). Tables I and 2
Note: All cost figures in 1990$. The 1980 figures were dellaled <lIld then converted to USS at a rate of S1.62/OM.












All Sectors $17,645 $6.987 SIO.657 60'70
1-9 employees 16.392 7.292 9. \()O 56
II
10-49 employees 16.811 6.841 lJ.971 59
50-499 employees 18.105 7.219 10.886 ' 60
>=5(Kl emnloyecs 21.296 6.152 15.144 71
Industry and Trade* 18.988 6.751 12.237 64
Crafts 14.850 7.480 7,370 50
Source: Bardeleben (1994. p. 287/288)
Note: Disaggregated data for other sectors are not available at this point. All cost figures in !lJ90S. The 19lJ I ligures
were dcl1ated <lIld then converted to US$ at a rate ofS1.62/OM.Table 3
Log Monthly Income Differentials for Male Apprentices by
Length ofTime with Training Firm in 1985
(Standard Errors)
Apprentices trained in lndustrv Finns Apprentices trained in Craft Finns
Time of Departure: (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Immediate .082 .019 .028 .050 .025 .029
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.021) (.020) (.02l)
:0; 1year .094 .066 .065 .027 .013 .015
(.013) (.012) (.013) (.011) (.011) (.012)
1-2 years .025 .011 .016 .010 .005 .005
(.009) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.008) (.009)
2-:' years .010 .002 .006 .004 .002 .004
(.OOn) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
)+ years -.001 -.003 .001 .006 .005 .005
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Schooling'! yes yes yes yes
Employing Finn Size & yes yes
Industrv Dummies'!
N' .095 .166 .252 .053 .104 .1406
N: 2302 2302 2302 3711 3711 3711
Note: Regression results using the 1985 Qualifikalion und Berufsverlaufsurvey described in the text. The estimates
were ohtaincd using a FIML estimator, assuming log-normality of the monthly income variable. All
specilicalions include dummies for size of training firm ~md a quartic in experience. Only males with more
than:' ye;u's of work cxperience were included. There were 9 dummies for training finn size and 42 dummies
for the industry of the employing finn. The reported values of iF were computed as 1-(0
2 /o~)where 0 and
0" are the errors of the estimate in the unrestricted and restricted (i.e., with a constant as the only RHS
v;u'iahle) regressions. respectively.Table 4
Incidence and Extent ofApprenticeship Training in West German Enterprises
Probit and Tobit Regression Results
(Standard Errors)
Probit Estimates
Dependent Variable: Apprenticeship Training
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
City -.392 -.001 .221 .215
(.132) (.158) (.175) (.176)
Urban Fringe -.382 -.269 -.161 -.161
(.118) (.121) (.127) (.127)
County Work Force -.357 -.23lJ -.227
(.075) (.OX5) (.OXX)
Out ofCounty Work Force -.243 -.242




Industry Finns (/100) (.030)
logL -545.76 -534.26 -530.00 -529.84
Tobit Estimates
Dependent Variable: IO*Number of Apprentices per Employee
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
City -.161 -.047 -.033 -.02X
(.044) (.051) (.057) (.057)
Urban Fringe -.156 -.119 -.084 -.084
(.040) (.041) (.042) (.042)
County Work Force -.106 -.065 -.053
(.025) (.028) (.029)
OutofCounty Work Force -.089 -.087
Within Commuting Distance (.027) (.027)
Number ofOther County -0.020
Industry Finns (/100) (0.013)
log L 1349.05 1358.23 1363.40 1364.58
Total No. ofObservations 1461 1461 1461 1461
No. ofCensored Obs. 356 356 356 356
(No Apprenticeship Training)
Note: Regression results using the 1992 cross-section of the Mannheim Inllovation
Pallel described in the text. All regressions include 6 dummy variables for finn
size. 10 state dummy variables and 30 dummy variables for industries at the two-
digit NACE level.Table 5
Payoff to Schooling and Training in the U.S. and Germany, 1986
Proportion ofofFull-Time, Not Self-Employed
Male Labor Force. U.S. Gennany
<=10 Yrs School <=10 Yrs School .089 .098
II Yrs School II Yrs School .027 .083
HS Graduate Apprentice .379 .632
Some College Some College .202 .076
College Graduate ColJege Graduate .302 .Ill
Ln Weekly Earnings Differential .0811 .0717
Per Year ofSchooli/lf! (25-64 vr aids!: (.0008) (.0011)
LI/ Wedlv Earnings Differential relative to
HS Graduates and Apprentices (25-64 yr aids):
<=](l Yrs School <=10 Yrs School -.229 -0.177
(.007) (.008)
II Yrs School II Yrs School -.116 -0.135
(.012) (.008)
HS Graduate Apprentice --- ---
Some College Some College .156 .210
(.005) (.013)




Note: Weekly e<Ullings differentials were estimated while including a quadratic in experience. U.S. data on white
non-hispanic full,tiine. non-self-employed male workers were drawn from the NBER merged outgoing
rotation group files from the Current Population Survey. Gennan data on full-time, non-self-employed male
workers were drawn from Qualifikation und BerufsverlaufSurvey 1985/86. Since earnings data for Gennan
workers were reported as bracketed variables, the estimates for Gennany were obtained using a AML
estimator assuming log-nonnality of the income variable. The reported value of 7[2 for Gennany was
computed as 1-(0
2
/ o~) where a and 0 0 are the errors of the estimate in the unrestricted and restricted (i.e..
with a constant as the only RHS variable) regressions. respectively.Table 6
Comparing Labor Market Outcomes in the U.S. and Germany











16-19 Yr Old Males
Unemployment Rate 15.7% 4.5% 12.6% 3.6% 27.2'7c· 9.2'7c
% ofUnemployed in 58.9 46.7 57.8 46.5 56.5 47.2
School
% Not in School & 3.5 1.1 3.1 l.0 5.5 2.4
Unemployed
20-24 Yr Old Males -
Unemployment Rate 10.4% 4.5% 6.8% 3.8% 12.3'lt lO.lJ'lt
% of Unemployed in 14.7 8.0 21.5 9.1 D.l) 4.lJ
School
% Not in School & 5.7 3.1 4.5 2.6 9.0 8.1
Unemployed
Note: The data for the U.S. were calculated using the Merged Outgoing Rotation groups in 1989 for the
academic year months (September through December and January through May). To he consistent with
the German data, these data were supplemented with data from the Defense Manpower Data Center on
the number of active duty military personnel by age, race and gender. Military personnel were counted
as employed and out-of-school in both the U.S. and Germany. The German data refer to residents in
former West Germany and were calculated using the 1991 Mikrocensus. Genn<m apprentices were
counted as being inschool and employed.Figure 1
Proportion ofApprentices Leaving the Training Firm
by Year of Apprenticeship Completion and Timing ofDeparture
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Figure 2
Age-Earnings Profiles 1979 for German and U.S. Comparison Groups
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Figure 3
Age-E;arnings-Profiles 1985 for U.S. and German Comparison Groups
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Figure 4
Job Tenure ofMale u.s. Highschool Graduates and German Apprentics
o us Mean Tenure /:; FRG Mean Tenure o us Tenure < 3 yrs /:; FRG Tenure < 3yrs
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